Misael Cordero v. Charles Warren by unknown
2015 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
5-21-2015 
Misael Cordero v. Charles Warren 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2015 
Recommended Citation 
"Misael Cordero v. Charles Warren" (2015). 2015 Decisions. 517. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2015/517 
This May is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2015 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
 1 
 
         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 14-2860 
___________ 
 
MISAEL CORDERO, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
CHARLES E. WARREN; WILLIAM J. ANDERSON, sued in 
their individual and official capacities; SUZANNE LAWRENCE 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 3-12-cv-02136) 
District Judge:  Honorable Joel A. Pisano 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
May 21, 2015 
 
Before:  FISHER, KRAUSE and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: May 21, 2015) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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PER CURIAM 
 Misael Cordero, a New Jersey inmate proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, 
appeals from the District Court’s order dismissing his amended 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
complaint.  For the reasons set forth below, we will affirm in part and vacate in part the 
District Court’s order and remand for further proceedings. 
I. 
 In May 2011, Cordero’s brother attempted to visit Cordero at prison.  The visit did 
not take place, however, because a drug-sniffing dog gave a positive alert at Cordero’s 
brother.  Although no drugs were found, prison officials suspended visitation privileges 
between Cordero and his brother for six months.  Cordero filed several grievances about 
this incident, all of which were allegedly ignored.  After the six months expired, Cordero 
and his brother sought reinstatement of visitation privileges.  These requests were 
allegedly ignored or denied.  In June 2012, after another six months passed, Cordero’s 
brother was authorized to have window visits, but not contact visits.  Cordero then 
requested that contact visits be reinstated, but this was denied.1 
 Cordero claims that the defendants denied reinstatement of visitation privileges 
with his brother—first entirely, then contact visits—in retaliation for his filing grievances 
and legal actions against them, and that this retaliation violated the First Amendment.  He 
also claims that this retaliatory action violated his First Amendment right to intimate 
                                              
1 Although not completely clear, Cordero seems to suggest that contact visits have not yet 
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association and his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual 
punishment.  Finally, he claims the defendants violated the New Jersey Civil Rights Act. 
 After screening the case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the District Court 
dismissed Cordero’s complaint for failure to state a claim, but permitted him to file an 
amended complaint.  Cordero submitted an amended complaint, but the District Court 
concluded that he still had not stated a viable claim.  Cordero timely appealed. 
II. 
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and our review of the District 
Court’s dismissal order is plenary.  See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 
2000).  “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual 
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”  Ashcroft 
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 
570 (2007)).  That is, Cordero’s “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to 
relief above the speculative level” to avoid dismissal.  Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 555.  
Because Cordero is proceeding pro se, we construe his pleadings liberally.  See United 
States v. Miller, 197 F.3d 644, 648 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 To state a First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff must allege that (1) he 
engaged in protected conduct; (2) he suffered an adverse action sufficient to deter a 
person of ordinary firmness from exercising his constitutional rights; and (3) a causal link 
                                                                                                                                                  
been reinstated. 
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existed between the protected conduct and adverse action.  See Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 
330, 333 (3d Cir. 2001).  The District Court held that Cordero failed to adequately allege 
facts to support the second and third prongs of his retaliation claim.2  As to the second 
prong, it held that Cordero failed to allege that he was deterred from exercising his rights 
and noted that Cordero has continued to grieve and pursue legal actions.  But the second 
prong is not a subjective inquiry.  See Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 376 (3d Cir. 2012).  
Rather, it “is an objective inquiry and ultimately a question of fact.”  Id.  Whether 
Cordero was deterred is immaterial; the question is whether “a person of ordinary 
firmness” would be deterred.  Id. (quotation marks omitted).  It is well established that 
retaliatory placement in segregated housing, with all its associated restrictions, could 
deter a person of ordinary firmness.  See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 225 (3d Cir. 
2000).  A fact finder could similarly conclude that a person of ordinary firmness would 
be deterred by the prospect of losing visitation with a close family member for six 
months or more.  Cf. id.; Bistrian, 696 F.3d at 376.  As Cordero notes, New Jersey 
prisons limit or suspend visitation privileges to punish and deter unpermitted conduct, so 
it is at least plausible that retaliatory application of this sanction could also deter lawful 
conduct.  See N.J. Admin. Code § 10A:4-5.1(c)-(e).  Accordingly, we conclude that 
dismissal of Cordero’s retaliation claim based on the second prong was improper. 
                                              
2 The District Court assumed, and we have held, that filing grievances constitutes 
protected conduct.  See Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 530 (3d Cir. 2003). 
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 As to the third prong, the District Court focused on Cordero’s initial loss of 
visitation and concluded that he failed to adequately plead a causal link.  But Cordero’s 
claim is directed at the failure to reinstate visitation privileges, not the initial loss.  To 
show that the failure to reinstate his visitation privileges was linked to his grievances, 
Cordero alleges that another inmate experienced the same punishment for filing a 
grievance about the loss of visitation.  Cordero also alleges that this inmate was deterred 
from pursuing legal action due to this punishment.  These facts, combined with the 
temporal proximity between Cordero’s grievances and his punishment—Cordero claims 
to have filed several grievances, all of which were allegedly ignored, leading up to the 
refusal to reinstate visitation—raise his right to relief above the speculative level.  Cf. 
Lauren W. ex rel. Jean W. v. DeFlaminis, 480 F.3d 259, 267 (3d Cir. 2007) (noting ways 
to establish causal link).  Cordero’s allegations suggest a pattern of retaliation that can be 
corroborated by other fact witnesses.  Accordingly, Cordero’s pleadings, construed 
liberally, satisfy the three prongs set forth in Rauser, and dismissal of his retaliation claim 
was improper. 
 The District Court also erred by dismissing Cordero’s First Amendment free 
association claim.  The District Court dismissed this claim as legally flawed, but Cordero 
persuasively argues that Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126 (2003), indicates that his 
claim should move forward.  Although the Supreme Court noted in Overton that 
“freedom of association is among the rights least compatible with incarceration,” it also 
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declined to hold or imply “that any right to intimate association is altogether terminated 
by incarceration or is always irrelevant to claims made by prisoners.”  539 U.S. at 131.  
The Court did not further define the contours of this right in Overton, turning instead to 
whether the restrictions on visitation were rationally related to legitimate penological 
interests.  Id. at 132 (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)).  Cordero alleges 
that the defendants failed to reinstate visitation privileges with his brother in retaliation 
for his grievances and that, in so doing, they violated the applicable regulations.  We 
understand Cordero to be alleging that the restrictions were not rationally related to 
legitimate penological interests.  Although the defendants may ultimately show that their 
actions were justified, at this early stage we must accept Cordero’s allegations as true.  
See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.  Dismissal of his claim First Amendment free association 
claim was therefore premature. 
 We agree, however, with the District Court’s dismissal of Cordero’s Eighth 
Amendment claim.  Cordero contends that dismissal was improper because Overton 
authorizes Eighth Amendment claims when the denial of visitation is “applied in an 
arbitrary manner to a particular inmate.”  539 U.S. at 137.  But there the Supreme Court 
was discussing “the withdrawal of all visitation privileges.”  Id.  Cordero’s claim centers 
on an allegedly arbitrary six-month failure to reinstate visitation with his brother, 
followed by non-contact visits only.  He also alleges only that this caused general 
suffering.  Such a temporary suspension of visitation with one visitor does not violate 
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“civilized standards of humanity and decency.”  See Renchenski v. Williams, 622 F.3d 
315, 338 (3d Cir. 2010) (quotation marks omitted); see also Wirsching v. Colorado, 360 
F.3d 1191, 1205 (10th Cir. 2004) (“[V]isitation with a particular person does not 
constitute a basic necessity, the denial of which would violate the Eighth Amendment.”).  
Accordingly, the District Court properly dismissed Cordero’s Eighth Amendment claim.   
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate in part and affirm in part the District 
Court’s order dismissing Cordero’s amended complaint and remand for proceedings 
consistent with this opinion.3 
                                              
3 Because the District Court’s decision to decline supplemental jurisdiction over 
Cordero’s state law claim was premised on its dismissal of all of his federal claims, see 
28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), we will vacate that aspect of the District Court’s judgment, too, 
and remand for further consideration. 
